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Refugees’ human rights and the challenge
of political will
by James C. Hathaway
The following essay is excerpted from the Epilogue to The Rights of Refugees Under
International Law by James C. Hathaway. © James C. Hathaway 2005 (Cambridge
University Press). Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.Totaling
nearly 1,200 pages and a decade in the making, The Rights of Refugees Under
International Law links standards of the UN Refugee Convention to norms of international
human rights law and applies this to empirical analyses of some of the world’s most difﬁcult
protection challenges.

G

overnments in all parts of the world are withdrawing in
practice from meeting the legal duty to provide refugees with
the protection they require. While states continue to proclaim
a willingness to assist refugees as a matter of political discretion or humanitarian goodwill, many appear committed to a
pattern of defensive strategies designed to avoid international
legal responsibility toward involuntary migrants. Some see
this shift away from a legal paradigm of refugee protection as a
source of enhanced operational ﬂexibility in the face of changed
political circumstances. For refugees themselves, however, the
increasingly marginal relevance of international refugee law has
in practice signaled a shift to inferior or illusory protection.
It has also imposed intolerable costs on many of the poorest
countries, and has involved states in practices antithetical to
their basic political values.
In the face of resistance of this kind, it be must recognized
that no international oversight body (or international agency)
will ever be positioned actually to require governments to
implement rights perceived by states as at odds with their
fundamental interests. The real challenge is therefore to design
a structure for the implementation of Refugee Convention
rights which states will embrace, or at least see as reconcilable
to their own priorities. Only with the beneﬁt of an implementation mechanism of this kind will governments be persuaded
normally to abide by even clear Convention duties; and only
when compliance is the norm will it be realistic to expect any
supervisory mechanism to be capable of responding dependably
and effectively to instances of non-compliance.
To be clear, it is suggested here that the goal should be to
reconceive the mechanisms by which international refugee law,
including the refugee rights regime, are implemented—not to
undertake a renegotiation of the Refugee Convention itself.
Those who favor the latter course seem largely to misun-

derstand the nature and function of the Convention-based
protection regime. The goal of refugee law, like that of public
international law in general, is not to deprive states of either
authority or operational ﬂexibility. It is instead to enable
governments to work more effectively to resolve problems
of a transnational character, thereby positioning them better
to manage complexity, contain conﬂict, promote decency,
and avoid catastrophe. Indeed, international refugee law was
established precisely because it was seen to afford states a politically and socially acceptable way to maximize border control
in the face of socially inevitable involuntary migration—an
objective which is, if anything, even more pressing today than
it was in earlier times. Refugee law has fallen out of favor
with many states not because there is any real belief either
that governments can best respond to involuntary migration
independently, or that the human dignity of refugees should be
infringed in the interests of operational efﬁciency. Rather, there
seems to be overriding sentiment that there is a lack of balance
in the mechanisms of the refugee regime which results in little
account being taken of the legitimate interests of the states to
which refugees ﬂee.
• First, some governments increasingly believe that a clear
commitment to refugee protection may be tantamount to the
abdication of their migration control responsibilities. They see
refugee protection as little more than an uncontrolled “back
door” immigration route which contradicts ofﬁcial efforts to
tailor admissions on the basis of economic or other criteria, and
which is increasingly at odds with critical national security and
related priorities.
• Second, neither the actual duty to admit refugees nor the real
costs associated with their arrival are fairly apportioned among
states. There is a keen awareness that the countries in which
refugees arrive—overwhelmingly poor, and often struggling
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with their own economic or political survival—presently bear
sole legal responsibility for what often amounts to indeﬁnite
protection.
In short, the legal duty to protect refugees is understood to
be neither in the national interest of most states, nor a fairly
apportioned collective responsibility. It is therefore resisted.
There are ways to address both of these concerns. As a
starting point, there needs to be a clear recognition that
refugee protection responsibilities can be implemented without
denying states the right to set their own immigration priorities.
The refugee regime is not an immigration system; it rather
establishes a situation-speciﬁc human rights remedy. When
the violence or other human rights abuse that induced refugee
ﬂights come to an end, so too does refugee status. Equally
important, even this right to protection is explicitly denied to
serious criminals who pose a danger to the host community,
and to persons who threaten national security.
Nor is the duty of protection logically assigned on the
basis of accidents of geography or the relative ability of states
to control their borders. To the contrary, governments have
regularly endorsed the importance of international solidarity
and burden-sharing to an effective regime of refugee protection. While collectivized efforts to date have been ad hoc and
usually insufﬁcient, they provide an experiential basis for
constructing an alternative to the present system of unilateral and undifferentiated state obligations. It is particularly
important to recognize that different states have differing
capabilities to contribute to a collectivized process of refugee
protection. Some states will be best suited to provide physical
protection for the duration of risk. Other states will be
motivated to assist by providing dependable guarantees of
ﬁnancial resources and residual resettlement opportunities.
Still other governments will collaborate by funding protection
or receiving refugees in particular contexts, on a case-by-case
basis. Under a thoughtful system of common but differentiated
responsibility, the net resources available for refugee protection
could be maximized by calling on states to contribute in ways
that correspond to their relative capacities and strengths.
In short, none of the legitimate concerns voiced by governments amounts to a good reason to question the underlying
soundness of responding to involuntary migration in line with
the rights-based commitments set by the Refugee Convention
and other core norms of international law.
Today, more than ever before, governments are engaged in
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a variety of serious discussions regarding reform of the refugee
law system. Perhaps spurred on by the formal commitment
made on the 50th anniversary of the Refugee Convention in
2001, there is clear interest in exploring both the operational
ﬂexibility which refugee law affords, and the value of systems
to share both the responsibilities and burdens inherent in
refugee protection. It is not at all clear, however, that these
initiatives are predicated on the central importance of ﬁnding
practical ways by which to respond to involuntary migration
from within a rights-based framework. Poorer states are glad
that there is, at last, some realization by governments in the
developed world that ad hoc charity must be replaced by ﬁrm
guarantees to share responsibilities and burdens. Governments
of wealthier and more powerful countries are pleased that the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other states are now
prepared to acquiesce in demands that their refugee protection
responsibilities not be construed to impose ongoing obligations
towards all who arrive at their territory. But potentially lost
in the discussions as they have evolved to date is the central
importance of reforming the mechanisms of refugee law not
simply to avert perceived hardships for states but also in ways
that really improve the lot of refugees themselves. It is not
enough to ﬁnd sources of operational ﬂexibility, nor even to
devise mechanisms by which to share the responsibilities and
burdens. If the net result of these reforms is only to lighten
the load of governments, or to signal the renewed relevance of
international agencies to meeting the priorities of states, then
an extraordinary opportunity to advance the human dignity of
refugees themselves will have been lost.
The real challenge is to ensure that the reform process is
actually driven by a determination fully and dependably to
implement the agreed human rights of refugees, even as it
simultaneously advances the interests of governments. There
is no necessary inconsistency between these goals; to the
contrary, they are actually mutually reinforcing priorities. The
Convention’s refugee rights regime establishes a framework that
can easily lay the groundwork for solutions to the current crisis
of conﬁdence in the value of refugee law.

